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Minding the Protest    
Attitudes towards different 
forms of protest action in 
contemporary South Africa
This article focuses on providing new insights into the nature of public opinion about protest 
action in South Africa. Since the mid-2000s the country has experienced one of the world’s 
highest levels of popular protest and strike action, combined with the recent resurgence of an 
active student protest movement. Sociological research into these protests has suggested that 
they represent distinct phenomena and that local protests have assumed plural forms that cut 
across simple violent/non-violent and orderly/disorderly binary distinctions. Despite the rapid 
growth of literature on South African protests, surprisingly little is known about public opinion 
relating to various forms of protest. Consequently, this article aims to examine differences with 
regard to the acceptability, perceived effectiveness and participation in respect of three categories 
of protest action, namely orderly, disruptive and violent protests. The article uses data from a 
protest module included as part of the 2016 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey, 
a nationally representative series conducted annually by the Human Sciences Research Council. 
Apart from determining the nature and extent of variation in opinion regarding the three types of 
protest action on aggregate, the article explores patterns of similarity and differentiation across 
societal groups, based on class, age, race, gender and geography. Finally, we analyse how 
and for whom perspectives on the three forms of protest have changed over the course of a 
generation by drawing on functionally equivalent data collected in 1995. The article concludes by 
reflecting on whether the evidence supports key hypotheses regarding the ‘rebellion of the poor’1 
in the country.  
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South Africa has experienced a remarkable 
rise in local protest activities since 2004, a 
development that has occurred on such a 
scale and with such intensity that it has been 
referred to as insurrection or insurgency.2 
Students, workers and a range of other 
actors increasingly employ protest tactics in 
their attempts at achieving social, political 
and economic change. These actions have 
been largely peaceful in character, while 
at other times protesters have tended to 
adopt more violent strategies.3 Sociological 
research into protests has suggested that they 
represent distinct phenomena and that local 
protests have assumed plural forms that defy 
straightforward classification. As such, there 
remains appreciable contestation regarding the 
nature, prevalence and determinants of these 
contemporary forms of protest. But despite the 
importance of this phenomenon for academics 
and policymakers, public opinion scholars 
have not examined how the general population 
views protest actions in South Africa. A growing 
literature exists on the likelihood of participation 
by and experiences of the protesters,4 but 
existing empirical evidence is not able to 
answer important questions about public 
attitudes towards protest action in the country. 
This article aims to address this knowledge 
gap by utilising nationally representative public 
opinion data to examine attitudes towards 
protest action in the country. 
Public attitudes towards protest activity are 
likely to be influenced by historical context.5 At 
the start of the post-apartheid period, South 
Africa had just emerged from a long struggle 
for democratic freedom that was characterised 
by protest actions. Using local and international 
newspaper reports, the Global Database of 
Events, Language and Tone,6 for example, 
documented 3.8 million protest events in 
1979. Most of these protests, particularly in the 
1980s, employed peaceful tactics. But violent 
protests were also utilised to bring about social 
and economic change.7 The level of protest 
dropped sharply in the 1990s but increased 
in 2004 and then escalated again after 2008. 
The Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD)8 
has recently noted a sustained increase in the 
number of protests in South Africa between 
2016 and 2017. The SCAD warned that violent 
protests were becoming more common, with 
communities increasingly employing protest 
tactics to draw attention to their grievances. 
Most protest actions, particularly after 
2004, seem to originate from South Africa’s 
economically disadvantaged communities. The 
source of people’s grievances seems to be 
economic in character, with protesters tending 
to cite the poor state of wages, labour market 
opportunities, municipal services and other 
material issues as predominant factors. Given 
that most protests share strong similarities 
in forms of contention, geographical space, 
organisation and demographics, it would 
appear that we are dealing with a broad 
process of protest, rather than merely a set of 
discrete events. Alexander has referred to this 
broad process as the ‘rebellion of the poor’.9 
Other scholars have ascribed the majority of 
protest actions to contestations over the full 
benefits of ‘citizenship’.10 Given the modern 
trajectory of protest, we may expect to observe 
distinct socio-economic differences in how 
people view protest action in the country. A 
plausible hypothesis would therefore be that 
those in the upper echelons of South Africa’s 
socio-economic class structure, as beneficiaries 
of the status quo, would be more inclined to 
favour social order and disapprove of protest 
actions as opposed to those in more vulnerable 
material circumstances. 
The reaction of government to local protests 
has ranged from contrition and negotiation 
to autocratic obstinacy. How government 
responds to a specific protest action can 
determine how effective that action is. This, in 
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turn, can have a significant effect on how the 
general population thinks about that action. 
Government’s response to a specific protest 
can be (and should be) mediated by public 
opinion. The responsiveness of government 
policies to the preferences of citizens is an 
essential element of most normative and 
empirical theories of democracy.11 In practice, 
however, the policy–attitude relationship 
is not perfectly linear and government can 
enact policies that defy the popular opinion. 
Nonetheless, the correlation between public 
opinion and public policy is considered to 
be a moral good, a crucial characteristic of 
successful democratic governance.
The reaction of law enforcement to protest 
action in South Africa has ranged from hostility 
to patient observance. A number of scholars 
are concerned that the former is more common 
than the latter. Royeppen contends that the 
state responses to protest today are in many 
ways a reflection of the state response to 
protest during the apartheid era.12 Indeed, as 
the number of protests in South Africa has 
grown, we have seen the emergence of a highly 
securitised policing response. Research by 
Newham and Faull has shown that the police 
in South Africa use paramilitary tactics that 
disregard human rights, much to the detriment 
of police–community relations.13 Such heavy-
handed policing can additionally lead to (or 
worsen) confrontations between police and 
protesters. Some critics have argued that the 
aggressive crowd control methods of the police 
have in many instances provoked protesters 
into responding with violence.14 Indeed, the 
manner in which the police dealt with protesters 
during the recent #FeesMustFall protests raised 
serious concerns among commentators.
When covering the growth in protest actions, 
the media has often made simple violent/non-
violent and orderly/disorderly binary distinctions 
about these actions. Such subdivisions are 
reductive, biasing audiences against certain 
social movements and presenting a false 
dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protesters. 
Given the limiting nature of these dichotomies 
for analytical research, we adopt a more 
nuanced approach to categorising different 
types of protest action in this article. More 
specifically, we employ the typology proposed 
by Runciman et al. as the basis for our approach 
to understanding public attitudes towards 
protest action.15 Runciman and her colleagues 
use ‘order’ and ‘violence’ as dividing lines. 
Because all peaceful protests are orderly and all 
violent protests are disorderly, it is possible to 
discern a three-way categorisation: (1) peaceful; 
(2) disruptive (i.e. disorderly but not violent); 
and (3) violent. Although in practice these 
three forms of protest are not always mutually 
exclusive, we have adopted these discrete 
categories for the purpose of quantitative 
analysis and monitoring social change.16 
Sociological research into these protests has 
suggested that these three categories represent 
distinct, meaningful phenomena. We believe 
that adopting this typology will allow us to gain 
a more comprehensive understanding of public 
attitudes towards these forms of political action.
In this article, we primarily aim to examine 
differences with regard to the acceptability and 
perceived effectiveness of peaceful, disruptive 
and violent protest action. We begin by 
outlining the methodology of our study, which 
is followed by a presentation of findings. Apart 
from determining the nature and extent of 
variation in opinion regarding the three types of 
protest action on aggregate, the results section 
explores patterns of similarity and differentiation 
across societal groups, based on class, age, 
race, gender and geography. This leads into an 
analysis of the determinants of public approval 
for each of the three types of protest action. 
This will provide a sense of the nature of the 
differences between the three forms of protest, 
and whether a hierarchy of protest exists in 
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the minds of South Africans. The article 
concludes by reflecting on possible avenues 
for future research.
Methodology
The data used for this study derives from two 
national surveys conducted by the Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the 
first in 1995 and the second in early 2017. 
Each survey was designed to be nationally 
representative of the adult population living in 
private households across the country’s nine 
provinces. Participation in each survey was 
voluntary and the data was collected by means 
of face-to-face interviewing. Strict ethical 
guidelines were adhered to, including review 
and approval of instruments and protocols by 
a Research Ethics Committee, and the use of 
consent forms to provide respondents with the 
assurance of the confidentiality of their interview 
responses. The 1995 survey formed part of 
the HSRC’s Omnibus Survey series and was 
conducted in February and March 1995. It was 
administered by MarkData, which at the time 
was the HSRC’s survey and opinion research 
centre.17 The survey had a realised sample size 
of 2 238 adults aged 18 years and older. The 
2016 protest data derive from a specialised 
module included as part of the 14th annual 
round of the South African Social Attitudes 
Survey (SASAS), which was conducted 
between January and March 2017.18 The 
SASAS 2016 dataset had a realised sample 
of 3 079 people aged 16 years and older. The 
sample sizes of both the SASAS and Omnibus 
series are in line with international best 
practices on public opinion sampling.19 Weights 
were designed for both datasets and all 
analytical results presented in this article have 
been weighted to be nationally representative. 
The 1995 and 2016 surveys were selected 
for use in this article because they are the 
only representative surveys in the country that 
distinguish between the three different types of 
protest action outlined by Runciman et al.20 In 
both surveys, respondents were told that they 
would be questioned about three different kinds 
of protest actions. The fieldworker then read out 
a description of a specific type of protest action 
and then asked how the respondent felt about 
that type of action. The exact phrasing of the 
descriptions is as follows: 
• Peaceful actions: ‘I mean non-violent things 
like worker strikes as well as attending rallies 
and joining marches that have been agreed 
to by the authorities.’ 
• Disruptive actions: ‘I mean things that 
are more forceful but still non-violent, like 
blocking traffic with tyres, stones or other 
objects, as well as occupying buildings or 
offices.’  
• Violent actions: ‘I mean injuring people or 
destroying other people’s property.’ 
Respondents were asked close-ended 
questions on how positive or negative they felt 
about the different types of protest action and 
then how successful or not they thought such 
actions were. Responses to each question were 
captured using a seven-point scale. In the case 
of the positive–negative questions, the scale 
ranged from extremely negative to extremely 
positive, while for the effectiveness questions, 
the scale ranged from extremely unsuccessful to 
extremely successful.  
A hierarchy in protest-
related attitudes? 
The national distribution in responses to 
the questions on the image and perceived 
effectiveness of the three types of protest action 
in 2016 is presented in Figure 1. For interpretive 
ease, the original seven-point scaling has been 
collapsed into a three-point scale. The bar chart 
points to the existence of clear differences in 
the way in which the adult public perceives 
these forms of protest action. Peaceful action 
on average tends to be viewed as more positive 
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Figure 1:  Image and perceived effectiveness of peaceful, disruptive and violent protest action in South   
 Africa, 2016 (%)
and effective than disruptive and violent protest 
action. While close to six in 10 South Africans 
regard peaceful protest favourably, this level of 
approval falls appreciably to around a fifth in the 
case of disruptive actions and barely a tenth 
in respect of violent protest actions. A similar, 
though marginally less acute, gradient exists in 
relation to perceptions of the effectiveness of 
these behaviours. 
The comparison between image and 
effectiveness ratings for each of the types of 
protest leads to an interesting observation. For 
peaceful actions, the share of the population 
viewing it as effective (46%) is lower than the 
share reporting that they view such action 
favourably (57%), which indicates that a certain 
proportion of adults support peaceful action 
but remain ambivalent or sceptical about its 
efficacy as a form of political behaviour. By 
contrast, for both disruptive and violent protest 
actions, the share considering such actions as 
effective (29% and 21% respectively) exceeds 
the share reporting a positive view (18% and 
12%). This implies that notable subsets of the 
adult population hold a negative image of such 
actions but do nonetheless admit that it is 
politically effective. Despite this, the overarching 
view on both the image and effectiveness of 
disruptive and violent protests remains largely 
negative in character. The question remains 
as to whether and how such attitudes have 
changed over time, especially given the rising 
incidence of protest-related actions since the 
mid-2000s.
The changing nature of 
protest attitudes
The responses to the attitudinal questions 
about the three types of protest action in both 
1995 and 2016 are compared in Table 1. The 
top half of the table presents the distributional 
patterns as well as percentage point and mean 
score changes in terms of the image of the 
different types of protest, while the lower half 
of the table depicts equivalent statistics on the 
perceived success of these actions. The results 
suggest that even though the majority of the 
adult public views peaceful protest action in 
a positive light, public attitudes towards such 
actions have become less favourable over 
the period. In 1995 close to two-thirds (64%) 
of the general public viewed peaceful action 
positively, while fewer (57%) held a similar view 
in 2016. It is worth noting that this change has 
not translated into an increase in the share 
who hold a negative view of peaceful actions, 
Source: HSRC SASAS R14 2016.
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but rather a greater tendency towards a 
neutral or ambivalent position. In contrast to 
peaceful actions, the share of the population 
viewing disruptive protest actions negatively 
showed a distinct decline over the past 22 
years from 81% in 1995 to 62% in 2016. 
The shares reporting positive or neutral views 
showed corresponding increases. We also 
find a softening in the manner in which violent 
protest actions are viewed over time, with the 
share of the population who classify this type 
of action as negative declining from 88% to 
74% between the two survey rounds. Although 
the predominant image of both disruptive and 
violent protests is still a disapproving one, 
there appears to be a growing acceptance 
among the adult public of disorderly forms of 
protest actions.
As for observable changes in evaluations 
of the success of different types of protest 
actions, we find the pattern largely mirrors 
what was described in relation to the image 
of such behaviours. A growing share of South 
Africans are ambivalent or sceptical about the 
efficacy of this form of political behaviour, with 
the share who stated that peaceful actions 
were successful decreasing from 61% in 1995 
to 46% in 2016. With respect to disruptive 
and violent protest actions, despite generally 
negative assessments, the group viewing 
such actions as successful in 1995 grew 
proportionally during the period under review. 
The percentage of respondents rating disruptive 
protests as unsuccessful fell from 71% in 1995 
to 51% in 2016, while the share regarding 
violent actions as unsuccessful fell from 81% 
in 1995 to 58% in 2016. This suggests that 
disruptive and violent actions are increasingly 
being seen as effective political tools, while 
peaceful actions are regarded with mounting 
scepticism. The scale of change is larger in 
relation to the perceived effectiveness of protest 
actions, relative to overall levels of approval. 
Table 1:  Changes in the image and perceived effectiveness of peaceful, disruptive and violent protest  
  action between 1995 and 2016 (Col %)
Peaceful Disruptive Violent
1995 2016 Diff. 1995 2016 Diff. 1995 2016 Diff.
Positive or negative image
Positive 64 57 -7 11 18 +7 6 12 +6
Neutral 9 16 +7 8 18 +10 6 14 +8
Negative 26 26 0 81 63 -17 88 74 -14
Total 100 100 … 100 100 … 100 100 …
Mean based on 7-point scale 4.50 4.47 -0.03 2.59 3.13 +0.54 2.19 2.63 +0.44
Perceived effectiveness
Successful 61 46 -15 14 29 +15 8 21 +13
Neutral 15 22 +7 15 21 +6 11 21 +10
Unsuccessful 25 32 +8 71 51 -21 81 58 -23
Total 100 100 … 100 100 … 100 100 …
Mean based on 7-point scale 4.49 4.14 -0.35 2.81 3.52 +0.71 2.43 3.16 +0.73
Note: The mean scores are based on the original 7-point scales, with higher values representing a more positive image or greater perceived effectiveness.
Source: HSRC Omnibus Feb 1995; HSRC SASAS Round 14 2016. 
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Cleavages underlying the 
attitudinal hierarchy
The pattern of results described above raises 
questions about the extent to which this national 
picture and trend is consistent throughout 
South African society. Is there broad consensus 
across socio-economic and demographic lines 
regarding how protest action is perceived, 
and have such attitudes been changing in a 
fairly uniform way for most citizens between 
1995 and 2016? We examined whether such 
a consensus exists or, alternatively, whether 
fundamental attitudinal cleavages characterise 
mass opinion on this topic in the country. Table 
2 presents mean evaluations and change in the 
perceived image of three types of protest over 
the period, based on two important attributes 
in the South African context, namely population 
group and educational attainment.  
The racial patterns in protest attitudes are 
particularly interesting. For white adults, 
attitudes towards all three types of protest 
actions have become more favourable over 
the period. By contrast, black African adults 
have become more negative towards peaceful 
actions, but more positive in respect of 
disruptive and violent actions. This pattern 
also applies to Indian adults, while coloured 
adults became appreciably more positive 
about peaceful protest and slightly more 
partial to disruptive protest, but their image 
of violence showed a modest decline. Taken 
together, these shifts suggest subtle racial 
variations, particularly regarding peaceful 
protest, while for disruptive and violent protests 
there is a more common perspective, with the 
image either improving or remaining stable. 
Again, it is important to emphasise that the 
improvements in the image of disruptive and 
violent actions that were observed still fall within 
an overwhelmingly negative overall position, but 
these do represent emerging signs of a notable 
change in predisposition among the public.  
When looking at differences based on 
educational attainment, it is clear that in 2016 
better-educated people were more favourably 
Table 2:  Subgroup changes in the image of peaceful, disruptive and violent protest action between 
 1995 and 2016 (mean scores)
Peaceful Disruptive Violent
1995 2016 Diff. 1995 2016 Diff. 1995 2016 Diff.
Population group
Black African 4.80 4.47 -0.34 2.79 3.22 +0.43 2.41 2.76 +0.35
Coloured 4.03 4.74 +0.71 2.58 2.90 +0.32 2.11 2.00 -0.11
Indian/Asian 4.18 4.12 -0.06 2.61 2.89 +0.28 1.94 2.62 +0.68
White 3.60 4.33 +0.73 1.80 2.70 +0.90 1.40 2.15 +0.75
Educational attainment
No schooling 4.40 4.46 +0.05 2.55 2.99 +0.44 2.36 2.41 +0.06
Primary 4.56 4.41 -0.16 2.84 3.20 +0.35 2.32 2.43 +0.11
Incomplete secondary 4.69 4.45 -0.23 2.58 3.25 +0.67 2.24 2.75 +0.51
Completed secondary 4.21 4.46 +0.24 2.39 3.13 +0.73 1.88 2.70 +0.82
Tertiary 4.09 4.60 +0.51 2.17 2.76 +0.60 1.53 2.29 +0.76
Note: The mean scores are based on the original 7-point scales, with higher values representing a more positive image or greater perceived effectiveness.
Source: HSRC Omnibus Feb 1995; HSRC SASAS Round 14 2016. 
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disposed towards peaceful protest action 
than those with low levels of education. This 
difference was not evident in 1995. In both 
surveys, the observed effect of educational 
attainment appears less linear when looking at 
disruptive and violent action. Further testing will 
have to be undertaken to accurately discern 
how exposure to formal education is influencing 
attitudes towards these two types of protest 
action in South Africa.
The pattern that is described above may 
be related to changes in the perceived 
effectiveness of a particular type of protest over 
time. We argue that the perceived effectiveness 
of a protest action could reinforce the positive 
or negative image of that action. To provide an 
indication of whether a cognitive belief in the 
effectiveness of protest does in fact influence 
one’s general predisposition to such actions, 
controlling for other socio-demographic 
characteristics, we conducted multivariate 
analysis. We opted to use an ordered logistic 
regression approach, since the dependent 
variables are ordered categorical protest image 
measures. In Table 3, we present three models 
that were generated, each corresponding 
to the general image of peaceful, disruptive 
and violent protest actions respectively. In the 
models, we include the perceived effectiveness 
measures alongside a set of socio-demographic 
characteristics as independent variables. Odd 
ratios are presented for ease of interpretation.
With regard to evidence on the socio-
demographic determinants of assessments 
of the image of protest, we find firstly that 
many of the demographic attributes in the 
models were statistically insignificant. Neither 
population group nor age emerged as a 
significant predictor of the image associated 
with each type of protest. Furthermore, we 
find that there is no clear or consistent gender 
effect. While women on average hold lower 
peaceful protest approval scores compared to 
men, there is no significant effect present in the 
case of the image of disruptive or violent protest 
actions. These findings are surprising, given the 
importance attributed to these characteristics 
in media representations of protest action in 
South Africa. There was also no effect based on 
marital status. A second notable finding is that 
the indicators of socio-economic status included 
in the models did not produce an especially 
strong or common effect on attitudes towards 
the different types of protest action. Employment 
status was not a significant predictor in any of 
the models, though educational attainment does 
exert an influence in two of the three models. In 
the case of public support for peaceful protest, 
the association is a positive one, implying that 
more favourable views of this type of protest 
are apparent as years of education increase 
(O.R. = 1.040). Education has an inverse effect 
on support for disruptive protest action, with 
approval waning as years of education rise (O.R. 
= 0.905). No statistically significant effect was 
observed in the third model. 
Geography seems to matter, though its effect 
varies across the three types of protest. 
Compared to residents in formal urban areas, 
those living in informal urban settlements tend 
to hold a more positive view of violent protest 
actions (O.R. = 1.582), even when holding all 
other independent variables constant. A similar 
relationship was not observed for peaceful 
or disruptive protests. Those residing in rural 
traditional authority areas tend to offer more 
positive views of disruptive protest compared 
to residents in formal urban areas, while no 
significant geographic effect is observed in the 
peaceful protest model. At the provincial level, 
and using the Western Cape as the reference 
category, we found that living in any of the 
other provinces (the only exception being the 
Eastern Cape) is associated with lower levels of 
support for peaceful protest actions. The largest 
difference is between the Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal (O.R. = 0.371). The provincial 
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differences observed in the model may be 
related to the unique history of protest and the 
prevailing political context in the Western Cape, 
and warrants further study. Such distinctive 
provincial differences were not detected in the 
other models. Appraisals of disruptive protests 
are significantly lower in Limpopo and the 
Northern Cape,21 while violent actions are 
more strongly favoured than average in the 
Free State. 
Table 3: Ordered logistic regression models examining the predictors of the perceived approval of 
peaceful, disruptive and violent protest action, 2016
Model I
Peaceful protest
Model II
Disruptive protest
Model III
Violent protest
Odds 
ratio
Sig.
Odds 
ratio
Sig.
Odds 
ratio
Sig.
Background variables 
Female (ref. male) 0.780 * 0.816 0.888
Age 1.008 0.994 0.994
Marital status (ref. married)
Widowed, separated or divorced 1.141 0.806 1.067
Never married 1.285 0.901 0.838
Population group (ref. Black African)
Coloured 1.051 1.305 0.774
Indian 0.777 1.336 1.395
White 0.738 1.149 0.878
Years of schooling 1.040 * 0.905 ** 0.990
Employment status (ref. employed)
Retired 0.894 0.755 0.903
Unemployed 1.021 0.797 0.892
Student 0.913 1.150 1.178
Other labour inactive 1.056 1.000 1.075
Geographic type (ref. urban formal)
Urban informal 0.848 1.465 1.582 *
Traditional authority areas 0.892 1.402 * 1.169
Commercial farms 0.959 0.899 1.199
Province (ref. Western Cape)
Eastern Cape 0.797 0.843 1.361
Northern Cape 0.603 * 0.606 * 1.340
Free State 0.604 ** 0.784 1.669 *
KwaZulu-Natal 0.371 *** 1.012 1.410
North West 0.452 *** 1.082 1.370
Gauteng 0.501 *** 1.018 1.233
Continued on page 90
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Note: * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: HSRC SASAS Round 14 2016. 
Model I
Peaceful protest
Model II
Disruptive protest
Model III
Violent protest
Odds 
ratio
Sig.
Odds 
ratio
Sig.
Odds 
ratio
Sig.
Mpumalanga 0.469 *** 0.735 1.371
Limpopo 0.541 ** 0.315 *** 0.735
Political party identification (ref. ANC)
Democratic Alliance 0.808 0.619 * 0.920
Unaffiliated 0.739 0.741 0.774
Other opposition parties 0.668 * 0.710 0.938
Undeclared 0.942 0.735 0.731
Perceived effectiveness of protest 
Peaceful protests 2.518 ***
Disruptive protests 2.107 ***
Violent protests     2.215 ***
Number of obs. 2815 2795 2821
Wald chi2(28) 359 263 265
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.125   0.108   0.124  
Concluding discussion 
Moving beyond simple violent/non-violent 
binary distinctions, we presented data on public 
attitudes towards three types of protest action 
in this study. We found that peaceful protest 
action was viewed more favourably than either 
disruptive or violent action. The extent of this 
hierarchy was then explored across different 
socio-demographic and geographic groupings. 
No considerable differences were observed 
between age, gender and race groups. In 
addition, and perhaps more surprisingly, 
no significant differences were observed 
between different class groupings. Noteworthy 
geographical differences were observed, and 
these patterns point to how ecological effects 
shape attitudes towards different types of 
protest action. Understanding these ecological 
effects is critical and, we believe, is a key area 
for follow-up research. This is likely to require 
exploratory qualitative research, including 
ethnographies and in-depth interviews, to 
capture specific geographic realities.
Attitudinal variables were found to be more 
powerful predictors of whether an individual 
approved of a specific type of protest action 
than socio-economic conditions. The perceived 
success of a specific type of protest action 
was shown to have a considerable influence on 
public support. This finding raises the question: 
when and why does protest action appear 
successful? We must remember that protest 
tactics – whether they are peaceful, disruptive or 
violent – are strategies utilised by certain groups 
in order to increase their bargaining ability with a 
specific institution(s). Protest tactics will appear 
successful to the extent that the institution(s) 
can be motivated to end the conflict in ways 
favourable to the protesters’ goals. How the 
institution(s) responds to the tactics of protest 
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movements is, therefore, very important to how 
different types of protest action are viewed. 
If, for example, the authorities ignore peaceful 
protest tactics, then such tactics will be seen as 
ineffective by the general population and public 
approval for peaceful protest action will decline. 
The link between attitudes and behaviour is 
well known, and the findings showcased in 
this study are therefore important. Although 
this relationship is indirect and is mediated 
by a range of different factors, research has 
shown that attitudes have a consistently 
dynamic influence on individual behaviour.22 
Consider, for instance, if public confidence 
in violent protest action grew significantly. If 
more people see violent protest action as 
effective and approve of it, we would expect 
to see greater public participation in violent 
protest activities. A considerable increase in the 
number and intensity of violent protests would 
place a substantial strain on law enforcement 
agencies that are already struggling to cope 
with existing levels of protest activity. Moreover, 
an adult population who favoured violent protest 
tactics would be unlikely to cooperate with 
the authorities in containing such tactics and 
arresting the perpetrators.
The study has used two time points (1995 and 
2016) to comment on how attitudes towards 
protest action have changed during the post-
apartheid period. The data suggests that the 
general population has become more negative 
towards peaceful protest actions and more 
supportive of violent and disruptive actions, 
even though the predominant view of the 
latter two types of protest remains negative on 
average. Although this article contributes to the 
understanding of mass opinion towards various 
forms of protest, there are clearly important 
questions that remain unanswered. The data 
used for this article contain certain limitations 
that make it difficult for the authors to be more 
conclusive about the changing nature of protest 
beliefs. The absence of more time points in 
our data series prevents us from providing 
more detailed commentary on the nature of the 
observed attitudinal change and how gradual it 
has been. Furthermore, we cannot be sure how 
sensitive protest attitudes are to period effects 
(such as a worker strike or student protest), 
and public opinion on protest tactics may be 
quite volatile. Further public opinion work should 
therefore aim to (1) identify other attitudinal and 
contextual correlates of protest beliefs, (2) more 
systematically monitor changes over time to 
gain a more accurate sense of the dynamism 
or stability of such attitudes, and (3) explore the 
relative influence of period effects. In so doing, 
we would greatly enrich our understanding of 
what must certainly be considered one of the 
most distinctive social and political phenomena 
in contemporary South Africa. 
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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